



The Freedmen’s Bureau in Maryland: An Early Experiment in Legal Aid  
 
Under Union occupation, a narrow majority of white men in Maryland voted to adopt a 
new constitution abolishing slavery on November 1, 1864.1 On the eve of the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s approval by Congress, Maryland’s new constitution promised freedom to the 
state’s 87,000 enslaved men and women, nearly 50,000 of whom were 20 years old or younger.2 
But no sooner had the constitution gone into effect than Maryland’s slaveholding class turned to 
the state’s apprenticeship law—which allowed state courts to order any black child “bound as an 
apprentice to some white person to learn to labor” until adulthood—as a means of re-enslaving 
newly freed young people.3 John Dennis was one of hundreds of freedpeople who petitioned 
officers of the Freedmen’s Bureau to help recover children who were “set free by the New 
Constitution” and immediately “bound out to their former owner” by court order.4 Like many 
who appealed to the Bureau, Dennis had no further recourse. He first went directly to the boys’ 
former owner, who told Dennis “he meant to keep them and do by them as he ha[d] done by his 
slaves in the past.”5 Hoping to contest the indentures in court, Dennis then sought out a local 
lawyer, who proposed to charge “ten dollars a case” for each of Dennis’s three children, a sum 
 
1 The 1864 constitution was approved by a mere 263 votes out of approximately 60,000 votes cast. William Starr 
Myers, The Maryland Constitution of 1864 (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1901), 97.  
2 Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 39; 
Wilma King, Stolen Childhood: Slave Youth in Nineteenth-Century America (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1995), 135.  
3 The Maryland Code: Public General Laws and Public Local Laws (Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., 1860), 38. 
4 Statement of John, in Communication from Major General Lew Wallace in Relation to the Freedman’s Bureau to 
the General Assembly of Maryland (Annapolis, MD: Richard P. Bayly, 1865), 17; John Dennis to Gen. Wallace, 
December 6, 1864, in ibid., 18. As John Dennis explained, his children, like many enslaved young people torn from 
their families through sale or war, had been separated from their mother by their enslaver in 1859, and then parted 
from their father when he sought to enlist in the Union army, which offered a means of emancipation.  
5 Ibid. 
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likely equal to several months’ wages.6 Dennis then turned to the Freedmen’s Bureau, the federal 
officers charged with enforcing his rights, to see “if [they] could not do anything for [him].”7 The 
strategic alliance between freedpeople and Bureau officers that arose out of scores of similar 
petitions proved decisive in defeating forced apprenticeship in Maryland. Critical to the success 
of this alliance—though little studied by historians—was a novel, federally funded program of 
legal assistance instituted by the Freedmen’s Bureau to address the problem Dennis and many 
other parents faced: the prohibitive expense of hiring a lawyer to recover individual children, 
much less mount an attack on the entire apprenticeship system. Records of the Bureau’s 
operations in Maryland show that the Bureau began funding habeas actions to recover indentured 
children, like Dennis’s, in 1865, and ultimately staffed a successful constitutional challenge to 
the apprenticeship law in 1867. The campaign against apprenticeship in Maryland, then, should 
not be understood merely as a singular response to a local crisis, but as an important test of the 
federal government’s commitment to enforcing freedpeople’s rights and its capacity to meet 
citizens’ needs, including the demand for legal assistance.  
While historians have noted the Bureau’s role in challenging apprenticeship in Maryland, 
they have not typically recognized its role in staffing legal aid lawyers and funding test litigation, 
and therefore have overlooked the Bureau’s significance as the nation’s first, albeit short-lived, 
experiment in federally funded legal aid.8 The Freedmen’s Bureau not only set up its own courts 
 
6 Ibid. For reference, wage scales established by the Freedmen’s Bureau in Georgia in 1866 ranged from $12-15 a 
month for male farm hands. Sara Rapport, “The Freedmen’s Bureau as a Legal Agent for Black Men and Women in 
Georgia: 1865-1868,” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 73, no. 1 (1989), 32. 
7 Statement of John Dennis, in Communication from Major General Lew Wallace, 18. 
8 Historians have offered valuable studies of apprenticeship and Bureau activities in Maryland, but have not closely 
examined the mechanics of the Bureau’s legal aid function, nor connected the Maryland campaign to the Bureau’s 
legal aid efforts elsewhere. See, for example, Barbara Jeanne Fields, Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground: 
Maryland During the Nineteenth Century (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), chap. 6; Richard Paul Fuke, 
Imperfect Equality: African Americans and the Confines of White Racial Attitudes in Post-Emancipation Maryland 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1999), chap. 4; Fuke, “Planters, Apprenticeship, and Forced Labor: The 
Black Family Under Pressure in Post-Emancipation Maryland,” Agricultural History 62, no. 4 (1988): 57-74; Fuke, 
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to adjudicate cases involving freedpeople, but also hired lawyers to represent freedpeople in civil 
and criminal cases before state courts. In Maryland, freedpeople and the Bureau lawyers who 
represented them produced one of the most significant legal victories of the Reconstruction era: 
the ruling by Chief Justice Chase, in In re Turner, that Maryland’s system of forcibly indenturing 
black youth violated the Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act.9 Notwithstanding 
its importance, however, the Freedmen Bureau’s legal aid program has occupied a somewhat 
marginal place both in scholarship on the Bureau and in histories of government-funded legal 
assistance.10 Thus, a study of the Bureau’s legal aid program in Maryland may offer new insights 
for several strands of scholarship, too often considered in isolation: the role of the Freedmen’s 
Bureau in fulfilling, or failing to fulfill, the promise of Reconstruction; the role of black 
communities in shaping civil rights enforcement; and the rise of organized legal aid for the poor 
before the creation of a modern welfare state. 
Examining the federal government’s approach to funding legal aid after the Civil War 
provides one means by which to measure its commitment to protecting civil rights and the legal 
process—and thus, a means by which to assess the Bureau’s role in the Reconstruction project. 
This history cautions against overstating or idealizing the role of Bureau lawyers, or the 
adversarial process generally, in delivering some semblance of justice to newly emancipated 
men, women, and children. Nevertheless, the Bureau’s legal aid program merits attention 
 
“A Reform Mentality: Federal Policy Toward Black Marylanders, 1864-1868,” Civil War History 22, no. 3 (1976): 
214-35; and W. A. Low, “The Freedmen’s Bureau in the Border States,” in Radicalism, Racism, and Party 
Realignment: The Border States During Reconstruction, ed. Richard O. Curry (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press, 
1969). 
9 In re Turner, 24 Fed. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C. Md. 1867). 
10 For one very valuable study of the Bureau’s legal aid efforts in the District of Columbia, see Howard C. 
Westwood, “Getting Justice for the Freedman,” Howard Law Journal 16 (1971): 492-537. On the Bureau’s legal 
activities generally, see Donald G. Nieman, To Set the Law in Motion: The Freedmen’s Bureau and the Legal Rights 
of Blacks, 1865-1868 (Millwood, NY: KTO Press, 1979). 
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because it partly confirms and partly complicates some of the standard historical assessments of 
the Bureau.11 
Early scholarly studies of Reconstruction by white historians of the Dunning School 
derided the Freedmen’s Bureau as an agent of Republican “carpetbaggers” and “negro rule,” an 
assessment intended to legitimize the dismantling of interracial democracy under Jim Crow.12 
More positive, revisionist histories of Reconstruction, pioneered by W.E.B. Du Bois’s Black 
Reconstruction in America (1935) and exemplified by historians writing during the Civil Rights 
Movement, partly redeemed what John and Lawanda Cox called the “misrepresented bureau.”13 
However, since historians began delving further into the records of the Freedmen’s Bureau in the 
1970s and 80s, scholarship on Bureau has often reflected a more negative assessment of “how 
essentially nonrevolutionary and conservative Reconstruction really was,” as C. Vann 
Woodward observed.14 Post-revisionist scholarship recognized the deeply racist and paternalistic 
assumptions that were harbored by many Bureau personnel and embedded in the Bureau’s 
mission to secure black labor for white landowners and curtail freedpeople’s “dependency.”15 
However, echoing Du Bois, more recent scholarship on the Bureau has shown that, despite the 
material and ideological constraints that hampered its ability to deliver more radical change, the 
 
11 For a discussion of historiography on the Bureau, see Robert Harrison, “New Representations of a 
‘Misrepresented Bureau’: Reflections on Recent Scholarship on the Freedmen’s Bureau,” American Nineteenth 
Century History 8, no. 2 (2007): 205-29. 
12 For a summary of the work of William Dunning and his students, and its influence on Reconstruction 
historiography, see Foner, Reconstruction, xvii-xix. 
13 John and LaWanda Cox, “General O. O. Howard and the ‘Misrepresented Bureau,’” Journal of Southern History 
19 (1953): 427-56; see also Harrison, “New Representations of a ‘Misrepresented Bureau,’” 205-06 (discussing 
revisionist historiography). 
14 C. Vann Woodward, review of The Confederate Nation, New Republic, March 17, 1979, quoted in Foner, 
Reconstruction, xxi. 
15 For a classic critical assessment of Bureau Commissioner O. O. Howard’s failure to deliver the radical promise of 
Reconstruction, see William S. McFeely, Yankee Stepfather: General O. O. Howard and the Freedmen (1968). For 
a general discussion of post-revisionist scholarship of the 1970s and 80s, see Harrison, “New Representations of a 
‘Misrepresented Bureau,’” 206-08. On the Bureau’s “war on dependency,” see Mary Farmer-Kaiser, Freedwomen 
and the Freedmen’s Bureau: Race, Gender, and Public Policy in the Age of Emancipation (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2010), 37; and Foner, Reconstruction, 152. 
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Bureau made an important difference in the lives of formerly enslaved people, not least by 
providing access to legal resources that freedpeople themselves harnessed to serve their own 
needs and aspirations.16  
The history of the Bureau’s legal aid program in Maryland goes to the heart of the debate 
about the Bureau’s efficacy and the role of freedpeople in influencing its agenda. This history 
illustrates the racism and conservatism inherent in the Bureau’s mission, as well as the Bureau’s 
significant achievements and novel strategies to overcome political obstruction and resource 
constraints. Moreover, as this paper’s case study shows, local communities—that is, free people 
of color, as well as the nearly all-white bar and bench—had an important hand in shaping the 
Bureau’s legal aid and law reform functions. The Bureau’s use of its fairly limited funds to 
provide legal representation to freedpeople showed that the Bureau, at least in some areas of 
operation, saw legal aid as a priority, and as a practical, though partial, remedy against Southern 
efforts to preserve conditions of slavery. Moreover, freedpeople’s recourse to Bureau lawyers 
revealed a new, potentially transformative relationship between citizens and the federal 
government. The Bureau’s legal aid program thus provided a mechanism for freedpeople’s own 
efforts to fulfill the promise of emancipation. Indeed, the history of the Bureau’s legal campaign 
in Maryland helps illuminate how the legal demands of black communities, at the local level, 
shaped federal civil rights enforcement during Reconstruction and laid the groundwork for 
 
16 For more positive assessments of the Bureau, focusing especially on political and economic constraints, and how 
freedpeople made use of Bureau resources, see, for example, Paul A. Cimbala and Randall M. Miller, eds., The 
Freedmen’s Bureau and Reconstruction: Reconsiderations (New York: Fordham University Press, 1999); Foner, 
Reconstruction; Nieman, To Set the Law in Motion; Rapport, “The Freedmen’s Bureau as a Legal Agent”; and John 
David Smith, “‘The Work It Did Not Do Because It Could Not’: Georgia and the ‘New’ Freedmen’s Bureau 
Historiography,” The Georgia Historical Quarterly 82, no. 2 (1998): 331–49 
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twentieth-century racial justice strategies, namely, civil rights test case litigation coupled with 
grassroots organizing.17 
In addition, the story of the Bureau’s legal aid program alters traditional narratives about 
government-funded legal assistance in the United States: it points to an earlier genesis, and 
suggests a vision of legal aid as not simply a program for the poor, but a tool of racial justice. 
Most existing histories of legal aid overlook that the Freedmen’s Bureau was the first, admittedly 
limited, venture in federally funded legal aid, which appeared about a decade before the first 
private legal aid societies formed to serve largely white immigrant communities in the urban 
North, and well before the creation of public defender offices and federal guarantees for indigent 
defense under Gideon v. Wainwright and the Criminal Justice Act.18 Recently, however, some 
historians have begun to revise the neglected history of legal aid. Felice Batlan, notably, has 
highlighted the role of women lawyers and clients in pioneering private legal services 
organizations in the late nineteenth century before professional male lawyers redirected the work 
of legal aid.19 Recognizing the exclusion of African Americans and other racial minorities from 
the purview of white legal aid reformers in the Progressive Era, Shaun Ossei-Owusu has 
emphasized the importance of race in the history of legal aid, from nineteenth-century 
abolitionist societies and the Freedmen’s Bureau, to the modern-day public defenders who 
operate “as an often-unacknowledged component of the welfare state and an underappreciated 
 
17 For analysis of the roots of twentieth-century civil rights organizing in late nineteenth-century legal campaigns 
and organizing by black women’s clubs, see, for example, Susan D. Carle, Defining the Struggle: National 
Organizing for Racial Justice, 1880-1915 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
18 The Freedmen’s Bureau program has sometimes been briefly noted in histories of legal aid as an early example of 
state or private charitable ventures to provide legal assistance to the poor. See, for example, Susan E. Lawrence, The 
Poor in Court: The Legal Services Program and Supreme Court Decision Making (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 18. For a discussion of the limits of legal aid historiography, see Felice Batlan, Women and 
Justice for the Poor: A History of Legal Aid, 1863-1945 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 3-14. 
19 See Batlan, Women and Justice for the Poor. 
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component of the penal state.”20 The Bureau’s legal aid program in Maryland, staffed with white 
lawyers, and dependent on the initiative of black plaintiffs, illustrates important themes in these 
newer histories of legal aid: the implication of legal aid programs in a system of class, gender, 
racial subordination, as well as the agency of legal aid clients and lawyers in challenging those 
systems of subordination.  
Part One of this paper provides an overview of the Bureau’s formation and operation, 
including its efforts to fund legal representation for freedpeople. These efforts, I argue, were 
central to the agency’s function and long-term impact. This account of the Bureau’s legal aid 
activities tests familiar arguments about the Bureau, both critical and positive. Next, Part Two 
presents a case study of the Bureau’s legal aid program as it operated in Maryland, explaining 
how the model of legal service and law reform took shape to address injustices in the postwar 
South. This study underscores the resource constraints and other obstacles to which the Bureau’s 
failings are often attributed. It also highlights the transformative impact of the Bureau’s legal aid 
program—most notably, in challenging Maryland’s apprenticeship system—and the Bureau’s 
dependence on the initiative of formerly enslaved men and women to achieve legal reform.  
 
I. The Freedmen’s Bureau and the Function of Legal Aid 
 Congress established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands by statue 
on March 3, 1865, placing it under the direction of General Oliver Otis Howard as 
 
20 Shaun Ossei-Owusu, “A People’s History of Legal Aid: A Brief Sketch,” in Stephen Haymes et al., eds., The 
Routledge Handbook of Poverty in the United States (New York: Routledge, 2015), 383. For further analysis of race 
in the provision of legal aid, focusing mostly on the twentieth century, see Shaun Ossei-Owusu, “Law’s Underbelly: 
Legal Aid from Slavery to Mass Incarceration” (PhD diss., University of California, Berkeley, 2014); Kris Shepard, 
Rationing Justice: Poverty Lawyers and Poor People in the Deep South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 
2007); Carle, Defining the Struggle; and Kenneth W. Mack, Representing the Race: The Creation of the Civil Rights 
Lawyer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
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Commissioner.21 Though formed in the final months of the Civil War, the Bureau was long in the 
making. Congressional discussion began in the immediate aftermath of Emancipation, as Union 
contraband camps swelled with men and women fleeing slavery and freedmen’s aid associations 
pressed Congress and the president to act.22 The House and Senate failed to agree on legislation 
proposed early in 1863, but ultimately heeded the recommendations of the American Freedmen’s 
Inquiry Commission, which Secretary of War Edwin Stanton established in March 1863 to study 
conditions in the occupied South.23 “For a time,” the Commission’s 1864 report urged, “we need 
a freedmen’s bureau.”24 Following the Commission’s call for “temporary aid” only, the First 
Freedmen’s Bureau Act placed the Bureau within the War Department and gave it limited life 
“during the present war of rebellion, and for one year thereafter.”25 The 1865 act charged the 
Bureau with “the supervision and management of all abandoned lands, and the control of all 
subjects relating to refugees and freedmen from rebel states” and occupied territory, with little 
further specification.26 The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act, enacted in July 1866 over President 
Johnson’s veto, extended the Bureau’s life for two years while broadening and clarifying its 
mandate.27 Of particular note, the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act, like the landmark Civil Rights 
Act passed in the same session, authorized federal jurisdiction over cases concerning the 
 
21 An Act to establish a Bureau for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, ch. 90, §1, 13 Stat. 507 (1865) [hereinafter 
“First Freedmen’s Bureau Act”]. 
22 On the Bureau’s legislative history, see Herman Belz, A New Birth of Freedom: The Republican Party and 
Freedmen’s Rights, 1861 to 1866 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 69-112; and Paul Skeels Peirce, The 
Freedmen’s Bureau: A Chapter in the History of Reconstruction (Iowa City: State University of Iowa, 1904), 34-45.  
23 For a discussion of the American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission, see Amalia D. Kessler, “The Freedmen’s 
Bureau Exception: The Triumph of Due (Adversarial) Process and the Dawn of Jim Crow,” in Inventing American 
Exceptionalism: The Origins of American Adversarial Legal Culture, 1800-1877 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2015), 266-75. 
24 Robert Dale Owen, James McKaye, & Samuel Gridley Howe, Final Report of the American Freedmen’s Inquiry 
Commission to the Secretary of War, May 15, 1864, available at 
http://www.civilwarhome.com/commissionreport.html.  
25 Ibid.; First Freedmen’s Bureau Act, §1, 13 Stat. 507.  
26 First Freedmen’s Bureau Act, §1, 13 Stat. 507. 
27 An Act to continue in force and to amend “An Act to establish a Bureau …,” ch. 200, §1, 14 Stat. 173 (1866) 
[hereinafter “Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act”].  
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protection of freedpeople’s civil rights.28 Until its dissolution in 1868,29 the Bureau pursued a set 
of expansive, largely unprecedented administrative projects: providing freedpeople and white 
refugees with food, clothing, transportation, and medical care; managing the sale or lease of 
abandoned and confiscated lands; overseeing freedpeople’s entry into labor contracts and 
marriages; setting up schools for black children and adults; and protecting freedpeople’s civil 
rights in court.30  
Tasked with assisting over four million freedpeople and managing 858,000 acres of land, 
the Bureau found itself chronically short on funds and manpower.31 Congress made no 
appropriation for the Bureau’s operations until July 1866, after President Johnson’s policy of 
restoring Confederates’ land extinguished the possibility of funding the Bureau through rents on 
abandoned lands—as well as hopes for widespread black land ownership.32 Congress 
 
28 An Act to protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their Vindication, 
ch. 31, §§ 3, 4, 14 Stat. 27, 28 (1866) [hereinafter “Civil Rights Act”] (giving U.S. district courts jurisdiction over 
offenses under the Act, and empowering district attorneys and Freedmen’s Bureau officers to prosecute violators of 
the Act); Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act, §14, 14 Stat. 176-77 (echoing the Civil Rights Act’s enumeration of the 
rights “enjoyed by all … citizens … without respect to race or color,” and giving Bureau and military authorities 
“jurisdiction over all cases and questions concerning the free enjoyment of such immunities and rights”). 
29 In July 1868 Congress provided that General Howard would wind up and withdraw the Bureau in January 1869, 
except for the Bureau’s educational department and management of black veterans’ claims. Act of July 25, 1868, ch. 
244, 15 Stat. 193-94. The Bureau’s remaining operations were discontinued through a June 1872 appropriations act. 
Act of June 10, 1872, ch. 415, 17 Stat. 347, 366. On the role of the Southern Claims Commission in handling 
freedpeople’s property claims after the Bureau’s withdrawal, see Dylan C. Penningroth, The Claims of Kinfolk: 
African American Property and Community in the Nineteenth-Century South (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2003), chaps. 4-6. 
30 Between July 1865 and August 1868, the Bureau distributed approximately 20 million rations, provided 
transportation for about 27,000 freedpeople and 3,000 refugees, provided medical treatment to almost 500,000 
freedpeople through 1870, and established schools attended by tens of thousands throughout the South. Robert C. 
Lieberman, “The Freedmen’s Bureau and the Politics of Institutional Structure,” Social Science History 18, no. 3 
(1994): 417. For the argument that the Bureau marked “the first broad effort in American history to build the 
operations of a modern administrative state,” see John D. Schmidt, Free to Work: Labor Law, Emancipation, and 
Reconstruction, 1815–1880 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 6.  
31 While the government held 858,000 acres of Southern land in mid-1865, 394,000 acres were returned to former 
owners by early 1866, and less than 140,000 acres remained by August 1868. Claude F. Oubre, Forty Acres and a 
Mule: The Freedmen’s Bureau and Black Land Ownership (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978), 
37. 
32 Foner, Reconstruction, 161 (“By mid-1866, half the land in Bureau hands had been restored to its former owners, 
and more was returned in subsequent years. … Johnson had in effect abrogated the Confiscation Act and unilaterally 
amended the law creating the Bureau.”). 
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appropriated $6,940,650 for the Bureau in July 1866 and $3,828,300 the following year.33 For 
comparison, from 1865 to 1870, the U.S. government spent over $4 million identifying and re-
interring the bodies of Union soldiers.34 With $147,500 of the Bureau’s funds appropriated each 
year for salaries, at its peak the Bureau could field only about 550 agents across thirteen states.35 
As historian Paul Cimbala has observed, the architects of the Bureau seemed almost to have 
“designed a blueprint for institutional failure.”36 But as historians have noted, the Bureau’s 
failings were not simply the result of resource constraints; they also stemmed from the Bureau’s 
ideological commitment to “laissez-faire liberalism,” the racial prejudice harbored by many 
Bureau agents, and the racist assumptions underlying the project to end freedpeople’s 
“dependency” on government support.37  
The Bureau devoted much of its energies to overseeing the administration of justice, 
though its record in securing the “immunities and rights” of freedpeople was in many ways a 
failure.38 The Bureau’s enforcement of exploitative labor contracts and its failure to convict 
perpetrators of violence against blacks, as historians have shown, abetted former slave-owners’ 
efforts to restore conditions of slavery and exposed the limits of the Bureau’s mission to make 
 
33 Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 176, §3, 14 Stat. 90, 92; Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 170, § 1, 14 Stat. 485, 486.  
34 Drew Gilpin Faust, This Republic of Suffering: Death and the American Civil War (New York: Vintage Books, 
2008), 238. 
35 Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 176, §3, 14 Stat. 90, 92; Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 170, § 1, 14 Stat. 485, 486; Harrison, 
“New Representations of a ‘Misrepresented Bureau,’” 214; Nieman, To Set the Law in Motion, 133. On different 
estimates of the Bureau’s peak manpower (depending partly on whether clerks are counted), see Westwood, 
“Getting Justice for the Freedman,” 497-98 n. 16. 
36 Paul A. Cimbala, Under the Guardianship of the Nation: The Freedmen’s Bureau and the Reconstruction of 
Georgia, 1865-1870 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1997), 223; see also Harrison, “New Representations of a 
‘Misrepresented Bureau,’” 213-15 (highlighting problems that arose because of the Bureau’s inadequate funding, 
short lifespan, and the institutional constraints of the military). 
37 On the Bureau’s commitment to “laissez faire liberalism,” see James Oakes, “A Failure of Vision: The Collapse 
of the Freedmen’s Bureau Courts,” Civil War History 25 (1979): 76. For a similar critique of the Bureau’s embrace 
of legal formalism rather than substantive justice, see Laura F. Edwards, A Legal History of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction: A Nation of Rights (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015). On the Bureau’s “war on 
dependency,” see Mary Farmer-Kaiser, Freedwomen and the Freedmen’s Bureau: Race, Gender, and Public Policy 
in the Age of Emancipation (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 37; and Foner, Reconstruction, 152.  
38 Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act, §14, 14 Stat. 177. 
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freedpeople “self-supporting citizens.”39 Nevertheless, as historians have also recognized, the 
Bureau provided a vehicle for freedpeople’s own efforts to fulfill the transformative potential of 
emancipation.40 Perhaps the chief evidence of the Bureau’s significance in this regard lies in the 
sheer number of freedpeople who turned to Bureau officials to seek redress—over 100,000 
complaints per year, by Howard’s estimate—and who protested the Bureau’s withdrawal.41 The 
Bureau’s operations in Maryland, as this paper will discuss, illustrated the complexity of the 
alliance between freedpeople and the Bureau. 
The Bureau’s legal activities were varied: Bureau officials acted as next friend to 
freedpeople in civil and military courts, reported injustices in the civil courts for possible federal 
intervention, served as judges in specialized Bureau or provost courts, and as arbiters for disputes 
outside the courts.42 Commissioner Howard’s May 1865 circular allowed Bureau officials to 
adjudicate disputes involving freedpeople outside the civil courts on the grounds that Southern 
states “disregard[ed] the negro’s right to justice before the laws, in not allowing him to give 
testimony.”43 However, the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act, enacted in the wake of Ex parte 
Milligan, specified that the Bureau’s jurisdiction did “not exist in any State where the ordinary 
course of judicial proceedings ha[d] not been interrupted by the rebellion,” or where such 
 
39 Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act, §2, 14 Stat. 174. For a classic study of how the Bureau “ultimately facilitated the 
restoration of black labor to the control of those who had previously owned them,” see Leon F. Litwack, Been in the 
Storm so Long: The Aftermath of Slavery (New York: Knopf , 1979), 386. For an overview of critical “post-
revisionist” scholarship on the Bureau, see Harrison, “New Representations of a ‘Misrepresented Bureau,’” 206-07. 
40 See sources cited supra note 16.  
41 O. O. Howard, Autobiography of Oliver Otis Howard, Major General United States Army (New York: The Baker 
& Taylor Company, 1908), 2: 370 (extrapolating the total number based on assistant commissioners’ quarterly 
reports of cases adjudicated).  
42 For an overview of the Bureau’s legal activities, see Nieman, To Set the Law in Motion. For analysis of the 
Bureau courts’ design, operation, and dissolution, see Kessler, “The Freedmen’s Bureau Exception;” and Oakes, “A 
Failure of Vision.”  
43 Circular No. 5, May 30, 1865, 39th Cong., 1st sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 70 (instructing Bureau officials to 
adjudicate cases involving freedpeople where the civil law had been interrupted or where local courts, “by reason of 
old codes, in violation of the freedom guaranteed by the proclamation of the President and the laws of Congress,” 
barred testimony by blacks).  
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proceedings had been restored.44 Thus, judicial power remained with civil authorities in 
jurisdictions—like Maryland and the District of Columbia—where civilian courts remained in 
continuous operation.45 Even where Bureau or military courts operated, they soon ceded 
authority to civil courts once Southern states removed de jure prohibitions on black testimony 
and achieved readmission under the Reconstruction Acts.46  
Thus, while the short-lived Bureau courts figure prominently in most historical analysis 
of the Bureau’s legal activities, the Bureau’s interventions in the civil courts were perhaps even 
more central to the agency’s function and long-term impact. Legal historians like Amalia Kessler 
have argued that the Bureau courts—characterized by a commitment to judicial discretion and 
substantive justice over procedural formality—reflected a “nascent … recognition of the limits of 
the then-dominant adversarial model.”47 However, the Bureau courts were not the federal 
government’s only response to injustice in Southern courts and the expense of “lawyer-driven 
adversarial procedure.”48 While the Bureau courts marked a brief foray into an alternative 
“conciliation court” model of due process,49 the Bureau pursued another experiment within the 
existing adversarial model of the civil courts: a novel program of federally supported legal aid. 
The Bureau’s funding of legal counsel for freedpeople, though similarly short-lived, prefigured 
the creation of private legal aid societies and state public defender offices in the coming 
decades.50 If the collapse of the Bureau courts highlighted a “reasserted commitment to 
adversarialism,”51 the Bureau’s legal aid program suggested a brief yet prescient recognition of 
 
44 Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act, §14, 14 Stat. 177; see also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (holding that 
trying civilians in military courts is unconstitutional where civilian courts are operating). 
45 Report of Charles H. Howard, October 22, 1866, 39th Cong., 2d sess., Senate Exec. Doc. No. 6, p. 34. 
46 Oakes, “A Failure of Vision,” 70. 
47 Kessler, “The Freedmen’s Bureau Exception,” 301. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 See Ossei-Owusu, “A People’s History of Legal Aid.” 
51 Kessler, “The Freedmen’s Bureau Exception,” 265. 
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the government’s obligation to fund the expensive, lawyer-driven model of adjudication to which 
it had committed itself.  
First, the scope of the Bureau’s legal aid function, though difficult to determine with 
certainty, challenges the notion that lawyers had little part in the Bureau’s approach to 
administering justice. Certainly, as historians like Kessler and James Oakes have observed, 
Bureau courts were often staffed by officials who lacked legal training and frequently resolved 
disputes without the involvement of legal counsel.52 Furthermore, Bureau records do not always 
make plain whether parties were represented by legal counsel or accompanied by non-lawyer 
agents.53 Bureau agents who acted as next friend were not typically attorneys. However, 
Commissioner Howard grasped the significance of staffing lay Bureau officers to appear in 
support of black defendants and plaintiffs, when the Bureau was unable to staff lawyers: “When 
nothing else could be done, it was something for an accused negro to have at least the counsel of 
a Bureau officer as a friend present in court.”54 Moreover, the Bureau’s practice of hiring or 
appointing lawyers from the private bar to represent freedpeople—under-recognized in histories 
of the Bureau—suggested that Bureau leaders recognized a “duty,” as the American Freedmen’s 
Inquiry Commission put it, “to employ legal counsel,” at least “in important cases.”55 
Furthermore, Bureau leaders’ invocation of the 1866 Civil Rights Act as authority for hiring 
legal aid lawyers suggested that they understood government-funded legal assistance to be, if not 
a constitutional right, then at least a necessary component of civil rights enforcement. 
 
52 The Bureau courts’ procedures varied by state, however. In Virginia, for instance, the Bureau set up panels of 
three judges: a Bureau agent and two local men, one selected by whites and the other selected by blacks. Otherwise, 
Bureau courts were headed by a single judge—a Bureau official or a state magistrate who agreed to admit black 
testimony. See Kessler, “The Freedmen’s Bureau Exception”; Oakes, “A Failure of Vision.”  
53 See Westwood, “Getting Justice for the Freedman,” 505. 
54 Howard, Autobiography, 2: 283. 
55 Robert Dale Owen, James McKaye, & Samuel Gridley Howe, Preliminary Report of the American Freedmen’s 
Inquiry Commission to the Secretary of War, June 30, 1863, available at 
http://www.civilwarhome.com/prelimcommissionreport.html. 
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As Howard Westwood has shown, the Bureau employed a series of lawyers to serve as 
Bureau solicitors, salaried and housed in offices paid for by the Bureau, in D.C. and Maryland.56 
The D.C. Bureau solicitor, A. K. Browne, reported handling hundreds of civil and criminal cases 
in little over a year.57 Lawyers hired or appointed by the Bureau in Maryland, as this paper will 
discuss, mounted challenges to the state’s apprenticeship law, in addition to providing criminal 
defense and assistance in wage disputes and other civil cases. Bureau records also offer evidence 
of federally funded legal aid initiatives in Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana, and the Carolinas.58 
The Assistant Commissioner for Mississippi, for example, instructed Bureau agents in October 
1865 to “engage an attorney to defend the Freedmen before the civil authorities,” and the next 
month retained an attorney “to appear before the Courts of the State of Mississippi for the 
defense of Freedmen, where it may be necessary that this Bureau should furnish counsel.”59 The 
Assistant Commissioner for Florida instructed his agents in October 1866 that it was “the right 
and duty of … the Court to appoint … counsel” for freedmen, and that Bureau agents were 
“under the Civil Rights Bill authorized to employ competent counsel to defend the rights of 
injured parties.”60  
 
56 Westwood focuses primarily on the Bureau’s legal aid program in D.C., but notes that the program “reached also 
into Maryland,” as this paper will discuss, and certain other states. Westwood, “Getting Justice for the Freedman,” 
529.  
57 A. K. Browne to C. H. Howard, October 10, 1868, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of 
Columbia, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1869, Record Group 105, National 
Archives and Records Administration [hereinafter “BRFAL”]. Many of the sources cited in this paper are contained 
in the collection of Bureau records entitled “Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, 
Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 1865-1869.” However, this collection includes a large share 
of the records of the Bureau’s operations in the district of Maryland, which was separately administered from the 
D.C. district, but which came under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, 
along with West Virginia and parts of Virginia. 
58 See Westwood, “Getting Justice for the Freedman,” 529-32.  
59 S. Eldridge to R. S. Donaldson, October 2, 1865, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the State of 
Mississippi, BRFAL; Special Orders No. 53, November 24, 1865, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the 
State of Mississippi, BRFAL. 
60 J. G. Foster to M. L. Stearns, October 6, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner and Subordinate Field 
Offices for the State of Florida, BRFAL; Letter to J. E. Quentin, June 12, 1866, Records of the Assistant 
Commissioner and Subordinate Field Offices for the State of Florida, BRFAL. 
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Second, given limited appropriations, the Bureau’s retainer of lawyers to represent 
freedpeople suggests that Bureau leaders, at least in some areas, saw legal assistance as a 
priority. Notably, given annual appropriations of $147,500 for salaries, and a $1,200 yearly 
salary cap for civilian agents,61 Assistant Commissioner Charles H. Howard hired a number of 
attorneys to represent freedpeople in Maryland at salaries of $100 per month.62 Bureau solicitors 
for the D.C. office received the same salary.63 Records indicate that the Bureau also subsidized 
solicitors’ office rent and the expense of traveling to take depositions, visit clients confined in 
jail, and attend courts in different counties. For example, Assistant Commissioner Howard 
assured the Bureau’s Maryland solicitor, Henry Stockbridge, that the Bureau would pay 
Stockbridge’s Baltimore office rent and would reimburse “[a]ll traveling expenses or business of 
this Bureau,” in addition to his $100 monthly salary, according to Army regulations.64  
However, lawyers who worked for the Bureau on a fee basis, without an appointed 
position, sometimes had to petition for compensation—an indication of the pressure to control 
costs. For example, the Maryland lawyer H. P. Jordan requested compensation from the Bureau 
 
61 Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act, §3, 14 Stat. 174 (allowing civilian agents of the Bureau to receive salaries 
between $500 and $1,200); Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 176, §3, 14 Stat. 90, 92 (appropriating $147,500 for the salaries 
of Bureau commissioners and assistants); Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 170, § 1, 14 Stat. 485, 486 (same). 
62 Special Order No. 28, February 26, 1867, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, 
BRFAL (appointing W. H. Owen as solicitor for the D.C. headquarters, at $100/month, to handle cases “of illegal 
and unjust apprenticeship of children of freed people and for such other cases as may be referred to him” from 
Maryland counties within the D.C. Assistant Commissioner’s jurisdiction); Special Order No. 97, June 15, 1867 
Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL (appointing Henry Stockbridge to the 
same duties and salary previously specified for Owen); Annual Report of Charles H. Howard, October 10, 1867, 
Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL (reporting the appointment of “J.S. 
Dalrymple, Esq., of Calvert county, [as] Special Agent of this Bureau,” to help with handling Maryland 
apprenticeship cases); W. L. Van Derlip to S. N. Clark, November 12, 1867, Records of the Assistant Commissioner 
for the District of Columbia, BRFAL (enclosing Dalrymple’s voucher for one month’s service, at $100).  
63 Special Order No. 36, May 23, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, 
BRFAL (appointing James C. Carlisle as D.C. solicitor at $100/month); Special Order No. 58, August 9, 1866, 
Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL (revoking Carlisle’s appointment and 
appointing A.K. Browne as D.C. solicitor at $100/month); Special Order No. 59, August 11, 1866, Records of the 
Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL (appointing E. J. Smithers, Browne’s partner, as D.C. 
solicitor, also at $100/month). 
64 C. H. Howard to H. Stockbridge, September 30, 1867, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of 
Columbia, BRFAL. 
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for his services in brining suits to recover apprenticed children, and in defending freedmen in 
several significant criminal cases.65 Jordan explained that he had “given [his] services in so many 
cases free, and paid [his] own expenses too,” and therefore “a little compensation if it could be 
had in justice to all, would not be objectional [sic].”66 Local Bureau superintendent William Van 
Derlip backed Jordan’s claim, writing, “Mr. Jordan has been a friend to the freedpeople and 
conducted many cases in Court for them without fee,” as “[t]he parties are very poor.”67 After 
hiring a new lawyer as Bureau solicitor on a salaried basis, the Bureau approved $75 in payment 
to Jordan for his past services in apprenticeship cases.68 
Mostly, though, lawyers’ and agents’ letters seeking compensation from the Bureau 
highlighted the dire need for the Bureau to help pay the prohibitive expenses incurred by 
freedpeople who came to state courts as plaintiffs or criminal defendants. For example, in a 
November 1867 letter, D.C. Bureau solicitor A. K. Browne complained that local police officers 
and magistrates “seem[ed] anxious only for [the] fees” that they could extract from black 
defendants and plaintiffs.69 The typical black defendant, he reported, “without an opportunity of 
being heard either by himself or by counsel [would be] either fined or committed to the 
workhouse or jail” because of “his ignorance to plead properly” or “his inability to pay if 
 
65 For examples of Jordan’s criminal defense work, see sources cited infra notes 68-72.   
66 H.P. Jordan to E. M. Gregory, October 1, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of 
Columbia, BRFAL. 
67 W. L. Van Derlip to W. W. Rogers, September 28, 1867, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District 
of Columbia, BRFAL. Likewise, Assistant Commissioner Charles Howard, writing to Henry Stockbridge about 
taking up some of Jordan’s cases, noted that “Mr. Jordan has served the freedpeople considerably, sometimes 
gratuitously and sometimes bearing his expenses or a small amount in the way of salary from this Bureau.” C. H. 
Howard to H. Stockbridge, April 20, 1867, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, 
BRFAL. 
68 W. W. Rogers to W. L. Van Derlip, October 1, 1867, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of 
Columbia, BRFAL. 
69 For example, Browne reported, police court magistrates charged black plaintiffs fees to issue warrants that were 
never executed. A. K. Browne to S. N. Clark, November 5, 1867, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the 
District of Columbia, BRFAL.  
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fined.”70 The D.C. solicitor’s office encountered huge demand for legal services: from July 1867 
to October 1868 Browne and his partner reported handling 592 civil cases—largely claims for 
money, as well as paternity and child support suits—and 291 criminal cases, “mainly … the 
prosecution of persons for outrages committed upon freedmen, and in the defense of the latter.”71  
Maryland presented a particularly urgent case for Bureau-funded legal aid, based on the 
state’s demographics, legal climate, and the nature of the emancipation process in Maryland. The 
Bureau’s legal aid efforts in Maryland—specifically, its legal campaign against involuntary 
apprenticeship—offer a case study of the Bureau’s successes, constraints, and failures in 
responding to the needs of newly freed people. It is a study, too, in how freedpeople themselves 
capitalized on a new, direct relationship with federal authorities—that is, how freedpeople sought 
to enforce the Bureau’s commitments, shape its priorities, and overcome its failings. Although it 
is difficult to assess with certainty what institutional or ideological legacy the Bureau’s legal aid 
program bore, during its existence the program marked a novel and important test of the federal 
government’s commitment to protecting civil rights, including the right to legal process. While 
historians have studied the Bureau’s activities in Maryland and the legal campaign against 
apprenticeship, scholars have not examined in detail the Bureau’s role in funding and staffing 
 
70 Ibid.  
71 Browne estimated that his D.C. office received an average of 25 calls per day from freedpeople, and sometimes as 
many as 63 in one day. Browne reported making 683 calls at the jail to see freedpeople who “were confined in jail 
and unable to employ counsel to defend them.” A. K. Browne to C. H. Howard, October 10, 1868, Records of the 
Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL. Browne’s report also illustrated the blinkered 
outlook of many of the white lawyers who represented freedpeople: Browne condemned Southern courts’ racial 
prejudice—that is, ex-slaveholders’ “great indisposition … to recognize fully the immunities with which the Civil 
Rights Bill clothe[d] their aforetime chattels”—while subscribing to racist stereotypes about his clients, for example, 
calling for more punitive child support legislation in order to correct “the licentious taint contracted in [blacks’] 
previous condition.” Ibid.   
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legal aid and test litigation, nor have they connected the Maryland campaign to the Bureau’s 
broader legal aid efforts, in D.C. and across the South.72  
 
II. Maryland: A Case Study of Legal Service and Law Reform 
Maryland—a state, in Eric Foner’s words, “as divided internally as any in the South”—
held nearly 84,000 free blacks and over 87,000 enslaved men and women on the eve of the Civil 
War.73 While the many slaves in Maryland who fled to Union armies early in the war helped 
propel President Lincoln’s plan for emancipation, the Union border state’s enslaved population 
remained exempt from the Emancipation Proclamation.74 After four years of Union occupation, 
Maryland abolished slavery on November 1, 1864 under the state’s newly adopted constitution.75 
While the Unionists who came to power in the 1863 elections secured formal abolition and 
repealed much of the state’s racially discriminatory legislation, a recalcitrant slaveholder class 
and a resurgent Democratic Party, bolstered by pervasive anti-black racism and violence, worked 
quickly to recreate conditions approximating slavery.76 Galvanized by the black community and 
 
72 As noted earlier, Westwood is among few scholars who have pointed to the Maryland campaign as an example of 
the Bureau’s legal aid efforts; however, Westwood does not discuss it in detail, as his study centers on D.C. See 
Westwood, “Getting Justice for the Freedman,” 515-16, 535. For more thorough analysis of apprenticeship and 
Bureau activities in Maryland, see sources cited supra note 8.  
73 Foner, Reconstruction, 39. The 1860 census reported a total enslaved population of 87,189, mostly concentrated in 
the tobacco-growing counties of the Western Shore, like Anne Arundel, Calvert, and Prince George’s counties. The 
free black population of 83,942 was concentrated mainly in Baltimore. “Black Marylanders 1860: African American 
Population by County, Status & Gender,” Maryland State Archives, 
http://slavery.msa.maryland.gov/html/research/census1860.html. 
74 On fugitive slaves in Maryland, see Fields, Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground, 100-01. 
75 Article 24 of the 1864 constitution declared, “hereafter, in this State, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary 
servitude, except in punishment of a crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; and all persons held to 
service or labor as slaves, are hereby declared free.” The Constitution of the State of Maryland, ed. Edward Otis 
Hinkley (Baltimore: John Murphy & Co., 1864), 18. The Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, not the 
1864 nor the 1867 state constitution, secured black male suffrage in Maryland. 
76 For a detailed political history of Maryland’s reconstruction, see William Starr Myers, The Self-Reconstruction of 
Maryland, 1864-1867 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1909). On the Bureau’s oversight of adult labor contracts in 
Maryland, which is beyond the scope of this paper, see Fuke, “A Reform Mentality;” and Fields, Slavery and 
Freedom on the Middle Ground, chap. 7. Bureau agent William Van Derlip reported that “many of the freedmen 
were cheated in 1865” when they first entered into labor contracts, but in 1866 gained leverage and obtained 
somewhat more favorable sharecropping and land-renting arrangements, an assessment backed by extensive Bureau 
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local Bureau agents, Bureau leaders instituted a legal aid program in Maryland to address 
rampant violations of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, specifically, civil courts’ refusal to recognize 
blacks’ legal rights, including the right to give evidence, and the effective re-enslavement of 
newly freed young people through court-ordered indentures.  
First, as Commissioner O. O. Howard recognized, funding legal counsel was incumbent 
in Bureau districts like Maryland, where state courts remained the exclusive forum for the 
administration of justice—and where, as Union general Lew Wallace reported in late 1864, “law 
officers [were] so unfriendly to newly-made freedmen … as to render appeals to courts worse 
than folly.”77 Commissioner Howard explained the rationale for appointing Bureau solicitors in 
D.C. and Maryland in his November 1866 report to Congress:  
Owing to the fact that no freedmen’s or provost courts were in operation in Maryland and 
the District of Columbia, and justice, where freedmen were concerned, must be obtained, 
if at all, through the ordinary operations of the civil courts, and especially owing to the 
great number of appeals to this bureau for assistance, which could only be rendered 
effectively in the courts, or which involved questions of law, a solicitor was 
appointed ….78 
 
Thus, where no Bureau or provost courts existed, and recourse to civil courts—“folly” or not—
was a necessity, federally funded legal counsel proved to be critical. As historian Chandra 
Manning has written, freedpeople and their allies in the Bureau “confronted the simultaneous 
 
records of contract disputes in Maryland. W. L. Van Derlip to W. W. Rogers, July 19, 1867, Records of the 
Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL. Bureau records offer evidence that at least some 
agents provided meaningful oversight over exploitative contracts. Explaining his refusal to approve one such 
contract, a Bureau officer in St. Mary’s County confessed, “a better embodiment of slavery under the guise of 
freedom I never saw.” E. F. O’Brien to S. N. Clark, January 4, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the 
District of Columbia, BRFAL. 
77 Maj. Gen. Wallace, General Orders No. 112, November 9, 1865, in Communication from Major General Lew 
Wallace, 4. 
78 Report of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, November 1, 1866, in 
Message from the President of the United States, 665. In 1866, before Howard appointed Bureau solicitors for the 
district of Maryland, the D.C. solicitor handled freedpeople’s cases in some of the neighboring counties of 
Maryland. See Westwood, “Getting Justice for the Freedman,” 508. 
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necessity and inadequacy of civil authority” to protect the rights of blacks in the postwar South.79 
Legal aid was a partial response to that dilemma. 
 Moreover, as in other Southern states, Maryland’s antebellum statutes barring black 
testimony and authorizing court-ordered indentures—laws retained by the postwar Maryland 
legislature and enforced by judges in violation of the Constitution and the 1866 Civil Rights 
Act—made Bureau intervention necessary to secure some modicum of justice for freedpeople in 
court. State law, until reversed under the 1867 constitution, provided that “[n]o negro or mulatto, 
whether slave or free, shall be admitted as evidence in any matter … in any court … where any 
white person is concerned, either as plaintiff or defendant.”80 Even after the Maryland Court of 
Appeals sustained the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act and affirmed “the competency of 
colored persons as witnesses” in July 1866,81 Bureau lawyers and agents in Maryland frequently 
protested to their superiors about local judges’ and lawyers’ exclusion of black witnesses and 
juries’ distrust of testimony by blacks, when admitted.82 For example, as one Bureau agent 
 
79 Chandra Manning, Troubled Refuge: Struggling for Freedom (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016), 277. 
80 Act of March 2, 1864, § 5(2), ch. 109, in Laws of the State of Maryland (Annapolis, MD: Richard P. Bayly, 1864), 
138. Article 3, Section 53 of the 1867 Maryland constitution provided that “[n]o person shall be incompetent as a 
witness, on account of race or color,” but with the proviso, “unless hereafter so declared by Act of the General 
Assembly.” The Constitution of the State of Maryland (Annapolis, MD: William Thompson, 1868), 57. 
81 Opinion of Judge Richard J. Bowie, Maryland Court of Appeals, July 2, 1866, enclosed in W. L. Van Derlip to W. 
W. Rogers, July 11, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL. Judge 
Bowie issued this opinion in a ruling denying the habeas petition of a white defendant, Dr. A. H. Somers, who was 
charged with brutally assaulting a black man, Hillary Powell, on the victim’s information. For a detailed account of 
Somers’s crime and the subsequent case, see Report of R. G. Rutherford, July 21, 1866, Records of the Assistant 
Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL. 
82 See, for example, John C. Carlisle to C. H. Howard, March 27, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for 
the District of Columbia, BRFAL (detailing the “practical disabilities under which the Colored people of Maryland 
labor,” and arguing that the most “grievious [sic] offenses” were traceable to the ban on black testimony); W. L. 
Van Derlip to W. W. Rogers, July 28, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, 
BRFAL (reporting that, “[n]ow that the magistrates signify a desire to be governed by the decision of Judge Bowie, 
the juries place another obstacle in the way by refusing to believe colored testimony”); E. M. Gregory to O. O. 
Howard, November 3, 1866, 39th Cong., 2d sess., Senate Exec. Doc. No. 6, p. 90 (reporting that a major “obstacle 
in securing justice to freedmen has been the refusal of justices of the peace to take the testimony of colored persons, 
in violation of the civil rights bill”); R. G. Rutherford to W. W. Rogers, July 19, 1867, Records of the Assistant 
Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL (reporting from Montgomery County that “[c]rime is punished 
by regularly organized civil tribunals and the testimony of colored people has, in some cases, been received in the 
County Court, tho’ there is a strong prejudice among members of the bar to its introduction”); and G. E. Henry to W. 
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reported, Judge Daniel Magruder of Anne Arundel County was indicted in late 1866 for refusing 
to admit black testimony and for sentencing black defendants to terms of slavery, under a 
provision of Maryland’s antebellum criminal code, in “palpable violation of the Civil Rights 
bill.”83 Similar reports came from Calvert County, where Judge William Tuck sentenced black 
defendants, without trial, “to be sold … at auction, to the highest bidder.”84 In June 1866, for 
example, five black men were sentenced to sale, for terms ranging from six to eighteen months, 
for the offenses of stealing a three-dollar pig, a one-dollar pocketbook, a five-dollar beehive, and 
twenty-five dollars’ worth of tobacco.85 By November 1866, the Bureau had secured indictments 
against four Maryland justices of the peace for refusing to admit black witnesses’ testimony.86 
 However, where indictments were insufficient to change practice, Bureau officials 
recognized the need to fund legal counsel for black criminal defendants in local courts. H. P. 
Jordan, the Maryland lawyer whom the Bureau paid before appointing a solicitor, sought to 
 
W. Rogers, July 19, 1867, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL (reporting 
similar resistance to black testimony in Prince George’s County). 
83 W. L. Van Derlip to W. W. Rogers, December 19, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District 
of Columbia, BRFAL (enclosing a copy of the Maryland statute authorizing judges to sentence slaves to sale “out of 
the state,” and to sentence free blacks to sale, in or out of the state, for terms of slavery). Van Derlip’s letters provide 
a detailed account of Judge Magruder’s persistent civil rights violations and Bureau agents’ struggle to get the 
district attorney to bring Magruder to trial on the indictments. In December 1866, Van Derlip reported that he had 
testified against Judge Magruder and that a grand jury had indicted the judge, but Van Derlip urged that “[n]o 
reliance [could] be placed” on the local district attorney, and that “it [would] require Counsel on behalf of the 
[federal] Government to prosecute.” W. L. Van Derlip to W. W. Rogers, December 26, 1866, Records of the 
Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL. Nearly a year later, though, Assistant Commissioner 
Charles Howard’s October 1867 report—also included in Commissioner O. O. Howard’s report to Congress—
revealed that the indictments against Judge Magruder were “still pending in the District Court,” and that the district 
attorney had been “repeatedly requested to bring these cases to trial but as yet [had] failed to do so.” Annual Report 
of Charles H. Howard, October 10, 1867, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, 
BRFAL; see also Report of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 
November 1, 1867, 40th Cong., 2d sess., House Exec. Doc. No. 1, pp. 659-60. 
84 The Calvert County Bureau officer protested that Judge Tuck “entirely disregarded” the Civil Rights Act by 
applying the Maryland slave code in criminal sentencing. For example, as the agent reported, Isaac Skinner, who 
was charged with stealing “a pocket book valued at $1.00,” was “sentenced to be sold in the State for one year,” and 
was later “bought by one John Stafford for $54.00.” S. N. Clark to C. H. Howard, June 16, 1866, Records of the 
Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL.  
85 Ibid. Similar methods for preserving conditions of slavery through criminal law, namely, the enforcement of debt 
peonage and convict leasing contracts, are the subject of extensive literatures beyond the scope of this paper. 
86 E. M. Gregory to O. O. Howard, November 3, 1866, 39th Cong., 2d sess., Senate Exec. Doc. No. 6, p. 90. 
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remove criminal cases to counties “where it was supposed a jury of loyal men could be found.”87 
However, as a legal strategy, removal was expensive, and no guarantee of success. For example, 
in an October 1866 letter, Jordan sought financial support for his defense of “six of the colored 
men charged with rioting” at the Shipley’s Woods camp meeting in Anne Arundel county: “Of 
course we shall not let them be tried here, and much labor and expense will follow the removal. 
They have no money to pay Counsel or expenses, and if the Bureau could help them it would be 
a real charity.”88 Jordan also served as defense counsel in the murder trial of William Shannon, a 
black veteran convicted of manslaughter after a white jury rejected unanimous testimony from 
twelve black witnesses that Shannon acted in self-defense against a mob of white men.89 
Notwithstanding Jordan’s presentation of witnesses and removal of the case to a more “loyal” 
county, according to Bureau agent William Van Derlip’s report, “the jury rejected all the colored 
testimony.”90 Bureau lawyers and agents petitioned for executive clemency, apparently without 
success.91 
The most prominent—and, ultimately, transformative—legal aid and law reform work 
undertaken by the Bureau’s lawyers in Maryland was in a multi-pronged campaign against the 
 
87 W. L. Van Derlip to W. W. Rogers, October 12, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of 
Columbia, BRFAL.  
88 H.P. Jordan to E. M. Gregory, October 1, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of 
Columbia, BRFAL. The camp meeting case was one of the more widely reported “outrages” against freedpeople in 
Maryland: local whites attacked black congregants at the Methodist Episcopal Church, and many of the black 
congregants were charged with rioting. “The Camp-Meeting Outrage—The Truth Vindicated,” Annapolis Gazette, 
December 25, 1866. 
89 W. L. Van Derlip to W. W. Rogers, October 12, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of 
Columbia, BRFAL. 
90 As Van Derlip explained, Jordan, “knowing the feeling in Calvert County against the freedmen, succeeded in 
having the case removed to Howard Co.,” but ultimately won only a “compromise” verdict of manslaughter, rather 
than willful murder. The state offered testimony on which “[n]o white man could have been convicted.” Ibid. 
91 Assistant Commissioner Charles Howard reported Shannon’s case to Commissioner O. O. Howard, who included 
Howard’s and Van Derlip’s accounts of the case, as well as the Bureau’s petitions to the governor for executive 
clemency, in his November 1866 report to Congress. Report of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Refugees, 
Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, November 1, 1866, in Message from the President of the United States … with 
the Reports of the Heads of Departments (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1867) 664. A year later, 
Charles Howard drew attention to Shannon’s continued incarceration. See Annual Report of Charles H. Howard, 
October 10, 1867, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL. 
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court-ordered apprenticeship of newly freed children and young adults in the state. Immediately 
following the abolition of slavery on November 1, 1864, Maryland planters revived the state’s 
antebellum apprenticeship statute effectively to re-enslave young freedpeople, through indenture, 
until adulthood. From 1864 to 1867, Maryland orphans’ courts apprenticed an estimated 2,519 
black children.92 The purpose was hardly disguised: as General Wallace put it, planters’ aim was 
to “nullify[] … the emancipation provision … [by] availing themselves of … the ancient slave 
code of Maryland.”93 As scholars like Margaret Burnham have noted, and as Bureau leaders 
themselves made clear, the court-ordered apprenticeship of black youth preserved two key 
features of slavery: the extraction of unfree labor, and the nullification of family bonds and 
parental rights.94 State courts defended the practice, not as a form of slavery, but as a vindication 
of the state’s responsibility to police parental unfitness and prepare black children for wage 
labor.95  
Orphans’ courts’ broad latitude to order the apprenticeship of black children to white 
masters, often the child’s former owner, lay in the state’s apprenticeship law. Maryland’s 
apprenticeship statute, like those of many Southern states, was modeled on the English Poor 
Laws, but included explicit racial distinctions.96 The provisions of the law governing black 
 
92 Fields, Slavery and Freedom on the Middle Ground, 153; Fuke, “A Reform Mentality,” 224. 
93 Maj. Gen. Wallace, General Orders No. 112, November 9, 1865, in Communication from Major General Lew 
Wallace, 4; see also H. H. Lockwood to S. B. Lawrence, December 15, 1864, reprinted in Ira Berlin et al., eds., The 
Wartime Genesis of Free Labor: The Upper South, series 1, vol. 2 of Freedom: A Documentary History of 
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apprentices directed orphans’ courts to “summon before them the child of any free negro,” and, 
if it “appear[ed] upon examination … that it would be better for the habits and comfort of such 
child that it should be bound as an apprentice to some white person to learn to labor,” to bind the 
child “as an apprentice to some white person,” males until age eighteen, and females until age 
twenty-one.97 Upon the court’s order, the sheriff or constable would “arrest and carry [the] child 
before the court” to be bound out.98  
Maryland’s white leadership justified planters’ use of the law in the language of 
proslavery paternalism, while invoking the Bureau’s own mandate to restore agricultural 
productivity and eliminate “dependency.”99 In a letter to the Bureau provost marshal at 
Annapolis, Maryland orphans’ court judges defended apprenticeship as “an act of humanity,” 
explaining that they “invariably” bound black children to “their previous owners” when the latter 
were “known to the court to be proper persons to care for & bring them up in habits of 
industry.”100 Likewise, Governor Augustus Bradford insisted that the apprenticeship law, 
because it specifically applied to free blacks, was unaffected by abolition, and was “particularly 
required by the new state of things” to avert the “great danger … of large number[s] of [black 
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minors] being suddenly thrown adrift in every county of the state.”101 Dismissing freedpeople’s 
complaints of illegal indentures, Bradford argued that parents possessed the “entirely adequate 
security” of habeas corpus petitions—disregarding a problem frequently highlighted by Bureau 
lawyers and agents, namely, the “considerable expense to pay for suing out and serving the 
writs.”102  
The statute’s explicit distinction between the treatment of white and black apprentices—a 
key premise for suits challenging the law under the Constitution and the Civil Rights Act—gave 
the lie to the law’s purportedly charitable aims. The provisions governing white apprentices 
contained at least nominal protections against “cruel or improper” treatment by masters, as well 
as specific grounds on which white children could be apprenticed, in contrast with courts’ 
unmoored discretion to separate black children from their families.103 The law required that 
indentures of white children include a promise to provide the child with “reasonable education in 
reading, writing and arithmetic,” and, “especially if a male,” training in “some useful art or 
trade.”104 The provisions on black apprentices, however, explicitly specified that it was “not 
necessary … to require that any education … be given to [a] negro apprentice.”105 The law 
referred to black apprentices as “the property and interest of the master,” such that they could be 
assigned to third parties “[u]pon the death of the master.”106 No such language applied to white 
apprentices. As this paper will discuss, the law’s recognition of a property interest in black 
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apprentices provided an important weapon to masters who sought to reclaim apprentices, even 
after Bureau lawyers and parents won their release, by means of replevin actions. 
Another racially discriminatory provision that posed a formidable challenge in the 
Bureau’s legal campaign against apprenticeship was the criminalization of enticement, again, 
only in the case of black apprentices. The law made it a crime, punishable by up to four years’ 
imprisonment, for “any negro or other person [to] entice or persuade any negro apprentice to run 
away or abscond from the service of [his or her] master,” and it allowed orphans’ court judges to 
bind black children who left their masters to longer terms in order to “compensate the master.”107 
By contrast, the law only imposed a twenty-dollar fine and damages on “any person” who 
“entic[ed]” a white apprentice to leave or disobey his or her master.108  
Above all, the outpouring of complaints by freedpeople whose children were forcibly 
indentured testified to the rampant abuse of Maryland’s apprenticeship law, and motivated the 
Bureau to fund legal challenges to the practice. Freedpeople’s petitions effectively galvanized 
the Bureau two primary reasons: they demonstrated the need for federal legal intervention where 
state authorities gave no recourse and self-help posed dangers; and they framed involuntary 
indentures as a threat to the Bureau’s mandate of promoting free labor and economic 
independence. First, freedpeople’s stories revealed the severe obstacles and dangers faced by 
parents, often mothers, in their efforts to recover indentured children, both through legal recourse 
and self-help. They also exposed the use or threat of physical violence underlying indentures that 
were, “apparently, in compliance with legal forms.”109 A Maryland freedwoman named Jane 
Kamper detailed her ordeal in November 1864: after the state’s declaration of abolition, her 
former owner William Townsend insisted that her “children should be bound” to him, “locked 
 
107 Ibid., 39. 
108 Ibid., 36. 
109 E. M. Gregory to O. O. Howard, November 3, 1866, 39th Cong., 2d sess., Senate Exec. Doc. No. 6, p. 90. 
 27 
[them] up,” and then, when she freed them “by stealth,” “pursued [her] to the Boat” on which she 
had hidden them.110 Seeking to recover her children from their former owner, Hester Anthony 
reported that the man threatened to “blow their brains out” before he would return them to her.111 
Freedpeople were not safe from violence in the courtroom either. As one Bureau agent 
reported from Calvert County, when Basil Croudy and his wife “refused to consent to the 
binding” of their three children in December 1864, “[t]he constable …, finding the mother 
obstinate, … struck her in the face with his fist in the presence of the judge,” after which the 
judge “reprimanded” the constable and proceeded to bind out two of the children.112 Judging 
from “statements made by parents,” Bureau officers reported, would-be masters frequently used 
“misrepresentation and threats … to compel [parents’] attendance at the orphans’ court, which 
attendance [was] considered equivalent to their consent,” though “in many cases, not even the 
presence of the parents was considered necessary to sanction the compact.”113 In some cases, 
apprenticed young people themselves petitioned the Bureau for aid. Carter Holmes wrote that he 
“was indentured or bound” to a Maryland planter in 1864, and was “so tired of not receiving any 
compensation for [his] services—no clothing, no chance for school—nothing but whippings that 
[he] determined to leave” for D.C. to seek his parents.114 Bureau agent William Van Derlip’s 
 
110 After making it to Baltimore, Kamper recounted her story in a petition to the Bureau to “regain possession of 
[the] bed clothes & furniture” that Townsend had taken from her. Statement of Jane Kamper, November 14, 1864, 
reprinted in Berlin et al., eds., The Wartime Genesis of Free Labor, 519. 
111 Statement of Hester Anthony, in Communication from Major General Lew Wallace, 9. 
112 S. N. Clark to C. H. Howard, June 11, 1866, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, 
BRFAL (reporting the “general complaint among the freedpeople in Calvert County … that their children ha[d] been 
illegally apprenticed to white masters,” and finding that “nearly two hundred children [had] been apprenticed in 
[the] County” from November 1864 to early 1866). 
113 E. M. Gregory to O. O. Howard, November 3, 1866, 39th Cong., 2d sess., Senate Exec. Doc. No. 6, p. 90. The 
Maryland apprenticeship law, by its terms if not in practice, required that “the parent or parents shall be summoned 
to be present at [the] binding” in orphans’ court. The Maryland Code, 38. 
114 Holmes wrote to the D.C. Bureau, “Please don't let Mr. Suit take me back for I have a mother and father 
(named Sylva and Abraham Holmes) who would care for me if they knew where I was. I think they are in this city.” 
The endorsement on Holmes’s statement noted that the Bureau superintendent sent Holmes to the D.C. Orphan’s 
Home, leaving it doubtful as to whether Holmes ever reunited with his parents. Carter Holmes to W. M. Beebe, 
April 22, 1867, Records of the Assistant Commissioner for the District of Columbia, BRFAL.  
 28 
July 1867 report revealed parents’ persistent efforts to reclaim children taken from them years 
earlier: “Not a day passes but my office is visited by some poor woman, who has perhaps walked 
ten or twenty miles, to see the ‘Agent of the Bureau,’ and try to procure the release of her 
children, … held, to all intents and purposes, in slavery.”115 Because of the law against 
enticement, Van Derlip explained, “[i]f she visits them, to see after their health, and how they are 
treated, she is arrested and sent to the penitentiary.”116  
Second, freedpeople’s petitions for legal assistance illustrated not only the Bureau’s 
responsiveness to black Marylanders’ claims, but also freedpeople’s own understanding of the 
Bureau’s priorities, whites’ assumptions about freedpeople, and the legal forms governing 
apprenticeship. A freedwoman named Lucy Lee, for example, buttressed her claim against the 
man who apprenticed her daughter by appealing to the Bureau’s political loyalties, writing, “[h]e 
is no friend to the Union.”117 Some freedwomen pointed to their husbands’ service in the U.S. 
Army in order to bolster their claims to federal assistance, draw a contrast with their former 
enslavers’ disloyalty, and, in cases where the child’s father was killed or disabled at war, to 
explain why the child should not be taken away for lack of paternal support.118 As Lee and other 
complainants recognized, Bureau officials understood involuntary indentures not simply as 
unfair contracts, but as acts of rebellion by “disloyal parties” who did “not regard the rights” of 
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freedpeople, in the words of Maryland Provost Marshal Andrew Stafford.119 Lucy Lee’s self-
effacing plea for aid also revealed her awareness of how the Bureau imagined its paternalist, 
educational mission: “Give us our children,” she wrote, “and don’t let them be raised in the 
ignorance we have.”120  
Moreover, freedpeople’s statements to local judges and Bureau officers demonstrated a 
keen understanding of the apprenticeship statute and the Bureau’s mission to eliminate public 
charges and encourage wage work. They took pains to refute the ostensible legal premise for 
apprenticeship—namely, a parent’s inability to support his or her child. The Maryland law 
governing black apprentices, on its face, prohibited apprenticing a child if the “parents [had] the 
means and [were] willing to support such child, and keep the same employed so as to teach 
habits of industry.”121 In practice, the law operated to deny black parents’ claims on the labor of 
their children, which was often crucial to families’ economic survival.122 This hypocrisy 
prompted rueful sarcasm from some Bureau personnel. In November 1864, the Calvert County 
agent wrote, “Gilbert, a child not an orphan, three months old, was bound” as an apprentice, 
“[r]ather young to begin learning ‘habits of industry’ certainly.”123 The more typical problem, 
highlighted in freedpeople’s affidavits, came when courts indentured teenaged children, old 
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enough to help support their families through wage work and therefore most valuable to former 
slaveholders, while leaving parents to support the youngest children unassisted. When 
freedpeople and their allies petitioned the Bureau to intervene, or protested apprenticeships 
before the orphans’ court, they took care to portray involuntary apprenticeship as a form of 
enforced dependence—an infringement of the right to earn wages and a threat to family self-
sufficiency. Joseph Hall, a white Unionist who frequently appealed to the Bureau on behalf of 
freedpeople, protested to General Wallace that “[t]he colored people here can take care of their 
own children, … as all or nearly all have children that they can get good wages for.”124 Emeline 
Woolford, a freedwoman in Talbot County, also petitioned Wallace to recover her four children 
from their former owner, explaining, “I can by their assistance maintain them.”125 Freedpeople 
were also careful to tailor their arguments to the Maryland statute’s language on parental 
support. John Lox, for example, presented the court with a note from his former mistress “stating 
that he was fully able to take care of his children and teach them habits of industry.”126 Likewise, 
Eliza Low urged that her daughter Harriet should be freed from indenture to their former owner 
because Eliza and her husband were employed, and “so the child [would] not become a charge to 
any one but [themselves].”127 
Such testimony complicated Assistant Commissioner Howard’s claim that staffing 
Bureau solicitors was necessary, in part, to avert “injustice … resulting to the freedmen from 
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their ignorance of the process of law or inability to employ suitable counsel.”128 Freedpeople’s 
understanding of the law laid bare the racial stereotyping underlying the Bureau’s professed 
pedagogical function.129 Certainly, legal counsel could provide great assistance to freedpeople 
facing a hostile and largely alien legal system, one designed to serve the interests of slaveholding 
whites. In addition, as the Maryland campaign makes clear, the Bureau’s legal aid program 
served an important informational function, raising freedpeople’s awareness of new legal rights 
and remedies.130 However, freedpeople’s engagement with the state’s legal system, and the 
Bureau’s legal aid program, tended to confirm the observation made by historians like Dylan 
Penningroth, namely, that freedpeople amassed considerable legal knowledge under slavery and, 
after emancipation, made strategic use of both legal and extralegal remedies.131 Indeed, the 
Maryland campaign exemplified how legal aid could produce a kind of feedback loop for civil 
rights enforcement, by informing Bureau lawyers about freedpeople’s legal needs and priorities, 
raising freedpeople’s awareness of legal rights and remedies, and providing the means for 
vindicating those rights.132  
Ultimately, black Marylanders’ appeals to Army and Bureau officers, and initial efforts to 
stop apprenticeship through military orders, exposed the difficulty of defeating Maryland’s 
apprenticeship system through self-help or pressure alone. After orphans’ courts began 
apprenticing newly freed children in “droves” in late 1864, immediately following the state’s 
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abolition of slavery, the U.S. Army promptly intervened to stem the pace of new indentures.133 
On November 9, 1864, General Lew Wallace issued General Orders No. 112, which established 
an early iteration of the Freedmen’s Bureau in Maryland to combat “forced apprenticeship” and 
“to carry out truly and effectively the grand purpose of … emancipation.”134 Wallace ordered 
that “all persons … now free … [would] be considered under special military protection,” and 
directed officers to “hear complaints,” “institute investigations, … and [] make necessary 
arrests.”135 In a December 1864 circular, Brigadier General Henry Lockwood issued a 
“[w]arning” to all Maryland planters that officers had “arrived … with orders to BREAK UP the 
practice now prevalent of Apprenticing Negroes, without the consent of their parents, to their 
former masters or others,” and “if necessary to arrest all persons, who refuse[d] liberty to such 
apprentices.”136 Former slaveholders immediately defied the Army’s orders. A lieutenant colonel 
reported in January 1865 that Eliza Goodwin still claimed the child she formerly enslaved as an 
apprentice, “without even having gone through the form of binding.”137 When the officer issued 
her “an order to appear and show by what authority she held the child,” Goodwin “burned” the 
order in front of him, “remarking that she would not read it for fear it would poison her.”138 
Henry Stockbridge, the Maryland lawyer who would later assume the position of Freedmen’s 
Bureau solicitor, wrote back that Goodwin’s conduct constituted criminal “contempt of military 
authorities” and a “direct violation” of the constitution’s prohibition on slavery.139 Stockbridge 
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suggested that the illegal indenture might be redressed through a habeas action—the first prong 
of the Bureau’s legal campaign against apprenticeships.140 
While military action, at least in some counties, effectively halted the rush to indenture 
children, without a ruling on the legality of existing indentures, officers lacked a solid legal basis 
to free children already apprenticed or to arrest those who held children in bondage.141 A 
convention of black leaders in Baltimore in December 1865 appealed to the Maryland General 
Assembly for “removal of the disabilities under which … [they] labor[ed],” and later petitioned 
President Johnson to intervene.142 Bureau leaders also lobbied the Maryland legislature “to 
procure a change in the law, but without success,” and even drafted “a proposed Act of Congress 
looking to relief for these cases.”143 Joseph Hall reported to Assistant Commissioner Howard in 
August 1865 that the freedpeople of Calvert County believed “they ought to have an agent 
appointed in [the] county” to address illegal indentures, and would “suggest one in whom they 
[had] confidence.”144  
Freedpeople, Bureau agents, and local lawyers soon identified the need for a federally 
funded legal aid program to attack apprenticeship on multiple fronts: bringing habeas corpus 
petitions, and defending against replevin claims, in order to invalidate indentures in individual 
cases; defending parents against criminal charges of “enticing” children to escape; and bringing 
test cases to attack the validity of the state apprenticeship law itself. The origins of the Bureau’s 
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legal aid efforts lay in early challenges to the apprenticeship system in the Baltimore Criminal 
Court: habeas petitions brought on behalf of freedpeople by the future Bureau solicitor for 
Maryland.145 Henry Stockbridge, along with three other Republican lawyers, Archibald Stirling, 
Jr., William Daniel, and Henry Winter Davis, brought several habeas cases before a like-minded 
judge of the Baltimore Criminal Court, Hugh Lennox Bond, in the spring of 1865.146 
Stockbridge, as a delegate to Maryland’s 1864 constitutional convention, had made an 
impassioned case against a “monstrous” proposed provision that would have declared it “the 
duty of the orphans’ court” to apprentice “all [minor] negroes emancipated” by the new 
constitution and, when choosing masters, to give “preference … to [children’s] masters while in 
a state of slavery.”147 Stockbridge also voiced racist views typical of white moderate 
Republicans: defending against charges that he favored social equality, Stockbridge derided the 
possibility that any black person could “becom[e] intellectually the equal of the white man.”148 
Judge Bond, a supporter of black suffrage, appeared more closely aligned with Radical 
Republican thought.149 Both proved to be concerted opponents of apprenticeship.  
One early apprenticeship case decided by Judge Bond provided an important foundation 
for the Bureau’s legal campaign: Leah Coston’s successful habeas petition to reclaim her sons 
Simon and Washington from their former enslaver, Samuel Coston.150 In May 1865, Judge Bond 
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discharged Simon and Washington from their indentures and denied Samuel’s appeal.151 While 
Judge Tuck ruled in Samuel’s favor in a separate proceeding,152 in July 1866 Chief Judge 
Richard Bowie of the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld Judge Bond’s decision on the ground 
that an appeal could not lie from a lower court’s order upon a habeas petition—without 
addressing Leah Coston’s argument that apprenticeship constituted “involuntary servitude 
contrary to [the 1864] Constitution.”153 However, in an August 1865 decision dismissing Adeline 
Brown’s appeal from her conviction for “[e]nticing and persuading a negro apprentice to 
abscond,” Judge Daniel Weisel of the Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the 
apprenticeship law, invoking Governor Bradford’s argument that the new constitution did not 
affect laws governing free blacks.154 Likely in reference to this decision, Joseph Hall wrote to 
Assistant Commissioner Howard in August 1865 to highlight the difficulty of “appeal to civil 
authority,” and to underscore the plight of parents “charged with persuading apprentices to leave 
their masters.”155  
In 1866, the Bureau took on a direct role in the legal campaign against apprenticeship and 
began funding legal representation for freedpeople in apprenticeship cases. William Van Derlip, 
Bureau agent for Calvert and Anne Arundel counties, promptly reported the 1866 Coston 
decision to his superiors as a useful precedent for securing the release of apprenticed children.156 
He closed his letter with a plea: “In cases in which the parties are too poor to procure counsel, 
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will the Bureau render assistance for that purpose?”157 Van Derlip began working closely with 
local attorney H. P. Jordan to hear complaints and raise funds in order to bring habeas cases 
before Judge Bond and bail out parents jailed for enticement. As Van Derlip later explained, 
Jordan helped to prepare freedpeople’s cases for trial at a time when the Bureau “had no 
Solicitor” for the Maryland district.158 Bureau officials’ communications with Van Derlip and 
Jordan confirm that, after request, Jordan received compensation from the Bureau for his 
services in apprenticeship cases, on a fee basis.159  
Letters from Van Derlip and Jordan highlighted the main challenges to combating 
apprenticeship: legal expenses, and the hostility of judges and lawmakers. Even before the 
“considerable expense to pay for suing out and serving the writs,” Van Derlip explained, it was 
“necessary … to procure a copy of the indentures,” which cost “50 cts. to $1.00 each,” a 
“considerable sum in the aggregate.”160 Though Jordan advanced part of the cost of the writs, by 
late 1866 the Sheriff of Baltimore refused to “serve any more without being paid his fees in 
advance.”161 Van Derlip “endeavored to procure the necessary funds from the parents,” but 
found that many were “entirely destitute, relying on the wages of their children for support.”162 
He urged that “[i]f any more of these [habeas] cases [were] to be taken up … some provision 
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must be made for the expenses, … and also for the lawyers to sue them out.”163 Van Derlip’s 
argument for federally funded legal assistance echoed a long line of complaints from freedpeople 
and Bureau officers about the prohibitive cost of legal action.164 Moreover, not all freedpeople 
could even find a local lawyer willing to take their money. One letter forwarded by Henry 
Stockbridge reported that the father of two boys who were “seized previous to the rebellion 
under the vagrant act” had in fact “carried $50 in cash … and offered it to a lawyer to procure 
their release, but the old man being dark complected [sic], was laughed at.”165 General Wallace’s 
Order No. 112 summarized the problem: state “law officers [were] so unfriendly … as to render 
appeals to the courts worse than folly, even if the victims had the money with which to hire 
lawyers.”166 
Still greater than the expenses of bringing habeas petitions were the fines and costs 
imposed on parents charged with enticing their children to escape. In these cases, black men and 
women were commonly arrested for enticement after recovering their children through habeas 
proceedings, because courts subsequently “replevined” children to their former masters.167 For 
example, Jordan defended Maria Richardson “on indictment for enticing apprenticed children to 
leave” their master after they had been “discharged by writ of habeas corpus and replevined” by 
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the same man.168 As Van Derlip explained, the judge who replevined Richardson’s children after 
Judge Bond released them—none other Judge Magruder, recently indicted for civil rights 
violations—claimed that “a writ of replevin issued by his court, took precedence of any 
proceeding of the Criminal Court.”169 Richardson was fined five dollars plus court costs—an 
exorbitant forty dollars total—and sent to jail for five days, to “remain 60 days longer unless she 
[could] raise the money to pay.”170 Writing to Assistant Commissioner Howard on Christmas 
Eve, Jordan explained that he had drawn up “a subscription paper” on Richardson’s behalf, and 
asked, “Have you it in your honor to assist her in paying the amount?”171 Van Derlip, however, 
responded that he “could not recommend the payment of the fine out of the Bureau funds, as it 
would establish a dangerous precedent.”172 The Bureau’s reluctance to pay individual fines 
reflected its generally tight-fisted approach to material relief and preference for private 
fundraising. The Bureau’s ultimate decision to fund legal counsel was therefore striking evidence 
that federal authorities had come to see legal aid as a priority.    
Ultimately, recognizing the great expense and “immense undertaking [of] consider[ing] 
each individual case,”173 in 1867 Assistant Commissioner Charles Howard formally appointed 
two lawyers as Bureau solicitors for Maryland, Henry Stockbridge and J. S. Dalrymple, to 
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manage the apprenticeship caseload and prepare test cases to overturn the apprenticeship law.174 
H. P. Jordan appears to have been passed over for the position because Judge Bond indicated that 
he “would prefer … someone else than Mr. Jordan.”175 Van Derlip suggested hiring a lawyer 
“residing in Baltimore,” as “it would save the expense of frequent journeys to Baltimore, and 
place [the Bureau] on a more cordial footing with Judge Bond.”176 Accordingly, in April 1867, 
“Henry Stockbridge, Esq., of Baltimore, was appointed … a Special Agent for the management 
of cases of illegal and unjust apprenticeship.”177 Likewise, judges of the Calvert County orphans’ 
court advised Howard that “the Court would be more inclined to a favorable consideration if the 
cases were prepared by a lawyer of that county.”178 Howard “therefore appointed J. S. 
Dalrymple, Esq., of Calvert county, Special Agent of [the] Bureau for [that] purpose.”179 By 
retaining dedicated legal counsel, supported with federal funds, and friendly with local judges, 
Howard sought to overcome the problems that his subordinates described: in particular, the 
Bureau’s inability “to legally test the matter, owing to the inability of complainants to furnish the 
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means required in paying expenses of court and sheriff.”180 While Dalrymple continued to fight 
indentures in orphans’ court, Stockbridge focused on litigation attacking the validity of the 
apprenticeship law itself, rather than challenging the legality of individual indentures on 
procedural grounds only.181 
Bureau lawyers and their clients faced stumbling blocks in their initial efforts to advance 
test cases. With the Bureau’s assistance, Maria Richardson appealed her case to the Maryland 
Court of Appeals, but confronted a court “reorganized by the Rebels”—that is, the resurgent 
Democrats.182 In 1867, the Maryland General Assembly struck back against Judge Bond’s efforts 
to free apprenticed children by “pass[ing] a law restraining Judge Bond’s power to issue writs of 
Habeas Corpus.”183 With their ally in the Baltimore Criminal Court disempowered, Van Derlip 
and Stockbridge promptly turned to the U.S. District Court in Baltimore. Stockbridge relied on 
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, which expanded federal courts’ habeas jurisdiction to persons 
held under the orders of state courts, a measure designed by the Republican Congress to bolster 
civil rights enforcement.184  
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However, Van Derlip was not optimistic about bringing habeas petitions before Judge 
Giles, the federal district court judge known to “sympthatize[] with the opponents of 
Congress.”185 Van Derlip’s pessimism was not entirely misplaced: Judge Giles held that 
apprenticeship under Maryland law “was not a case of involuntary servitude” within the meaning 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, and he therefore lacked authority under the 1867 Habeas Corpus 
Act to issue writs in apprenticeship cases.186 As Van Derlip explained, Judge Giles’s opinion 
rested “on the ground that the Dred Scott decision was the law of the U.S. and the parents of the 
children were not citizens of the U.S.”187 Stockbridge appealed Judge Giles’s ruling to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, but because the Court “was overcrowded with important cases, it was impossible 
for it to give these cases a hearing.”188 Stockbridge therefore trained his attention on “bring[ing] 
a case raising all the points before the Ch. J. as the Judge of this Circuit,” that is, to get a ruling 
from Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase while he was riding circuit in Baltimore.189 Chief Justice 
Chase’s decision on a facial challenge, Stockbridge anticipated, would “settle a great many 
cases.”190 A favorable ruling would not only free hundreds of indentured children, Bureau 
lawyers recognized, but could also overturn the legal justification for black codes across the 
South—namely, Judge Giles’s notion that emancipation had not disturbed Dred Scott’s holding 
that African Americans lacked citizenship rights. 
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The Bureau’s legal campaign against apprenticeship ultimately won success in October 
1867 in the landmark case of In re Turner, in which Chief Justice Chase, sitting in circuit court, 
struck down Maryland’s apprenticeship law.191 The case arose from a habeas petition brought by 
Elizabeth Turner, a then-eight-year-old girl freed through abolition on November 1, 1864, and 
indentured two days later to her former owner, Philemon T. Hambleton.192 At Turner’s hearing 
before Chief Justice Chase in October 1867, Stockbridge argued that Turner’s apprenticeship 
constituted involuntary servitude prohibited by the 1864 state constitution and the Thirteenth 
Amendment, and that the Maryland statute’s disparate treatment of white and black apprentices 
violated the Thirteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act.193 At a time when opponents 
of Radical Reconstruction vehemently challenged both the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment 
and the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act, which still awaited the backing of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the apprenticeship case would test the strength of an incipient 
constitutional revolution. Stockbridge invoked McCulloch v. Maryland and defended Congress’s 
authority to enact the law under the Thirteenth Amendment, while dismissing objections that the 
law unconstitutionally “impair[ed] the obligation of contracts” insofar as it invalidated pre-
existing indentures.194 Stockbridge’s arguments also echoed those he offered at the 1864 
constitutional convention, where he condemned the apprenticeship law for denying education 
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and other protections to black children, and for violating the “right of the parent to foster and 
educate the child.”195 Chief Justice Chase agreed: “the variance [was] manifest.”196  
In a brief but remarkable opinion, the Chief Justice ruled in Turner’s favor while 
upholding the legal framework of Reconstruction. First, Chief Justice Chase held, the Thirteenth 
Amendment “establishes freedom as the constitutional right of all persons in the United States.” 
Second, Turner’s “alleged apprenticeship” amounted to “involuntary servitude” within the 
meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment. Third, the indenture contradicted the provision of the 
Civil Rights Act guaranteeing “full and equal benefit of all laws.” Fourth, Chief Justice Chase 
held that the Civil Rights Act was constitutional under the Thirteenth Amendment’s Enforcement 
Clause, and finally, in a rebuke to his predecessor’s Dred Scott ruling, he affirmed that 
“[c]olored persons equally with white persons are citizens of the United States.”197 Chief Justice 
Chase ordered Hambleton to discharge Elizabeth Turner immediately, on the ground that her 
“detention and restraint [were] in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States.”198 
The decision was transformative for the “thousands of colored minors whose term of slavery had 
been protracted” by apprenticeship, as Stockbridge put it in his oral argument.199 Beyond its 
immediate significance as a victory for freedpeople and the Bureau’s legal team in Maryland, 
though, the Turner decision also signaled the radical potential of the Thirteenth Amendment as a 
vehicle for policing unfair contracts, including contracts for child labor, and vindicating the 
rights of black citizens, including minors, in federal court.200 Freedpeople, Bureau lawyers, and 
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Chief Justice Chase, in Turner, recognized the importance of the “full and equal benefit” clause 
of the Civil Rights Act in enshrining equal protection principles, soon to be constitutionalized 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. But they also read the Thirteenth Amendment to establish 
“freedom” as a potentially expansive positive right, shared by “all persons,” regardless of age or 
legal status.201 Though the Supreme Court ultimately did little to extend the implications of 
Turner, at the time the case drew national attention in the press for its defense of the Civil Rights 
Act and its challenge to the “remnants of the slave system,” as the New York Times put it.202  
Bureau officials immediately hailed the Turner ruling: “[a]s Mr. Stockbridge says,” Van 
Derlip wrote, “this decision releases every apprentice in Maryland.”203 However, the Bureau also 
promptly recognized the need to publicize, test, and enforce the decision—an undertaking in 
which the legal aid program proved instrumental. Within a week, Assistant Commissioner 
Charles Howard issued the Turner decision as Circular No. 8, with instructions for Bureau agents 
to “furnish a copy … to each person … holding apprentices in violation of the Civil Rights Law, 
… demand the immediate release of said apprentices,” and, “[i]n case of refusal,” institute “legal 
proceedings.”204 Armed with Chief Justice Chase’s ruling, Bureau lawyers and the parents of 
apprenticed children returned to Judge Giles’s court. In a January 1868 ruling on Jane 
Cromwell’s habeas petition, Judge Giles explicitly reversed his prior opinion and declared that 
the Turner decision would “govern [him] in all future applications of a similar character.”205 The 
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Bureau promptly released Judge Giles’s opinion as Circular No. 1, “as a notification to all parties 
illegally holding colored apprentices that they w[ould] be prosecuted.”206  
These circulars served not only to “enlighten” resistant masters, but also to spread word 
of the ruling—and the availability of legal assistance—to parents and apprenticed children.207 
Bureau agent Frederick von Schirach explained that, after the Turner decision, freedpeople 
“were at once notified through various sources to make their complaints known to the Office and 
steps were taken to settle the many apprenticeship cases that had accumulated” before Turner.208 
Von Schirach reported that in the year following Turner, Bureau lawyers closed 84 
apprenticeship cases and returned 110 children to their parents or guardians, with 61 cases 
“remaining open” as of October 1868, a few months before the Bureau was dismantled.209 
Bureau procedure was to send letters to “the party complained of,” with copies of Chief Justice 
Chase’s decision and Judge Giles’s decision, and then, if there was no reply, refer the case “to 
Mr. Stockbridge Bu. Solicitor.”210 For example, three days after the Turner ruling, Van Derlip 
wrote to Samuel Lucas to “demand the instant release” of the “two children of Eliza Ann 
Howard,” warning that if Lucas did not comply, the Bureau would “file a petition for their 
release … and ask for wages … and for the penalties prescribed by the civil rights bill.”211  
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The Bureau also combated efforts by the state to nullify Turner—demonstrating, on the 
eve of the Bureau’s disbandment, the importance of federal intervention against state civil 
authorities. In late 1867, Lott Warfield, who held Adeline Jackson’s children as apprentices, 
petitioned Governor Swann “to instruct the Attorney General to defend [his] case” against 
Jackson, and to “test the validity of Chief Justice Chase’s decision.”212 Maryland Attorney 
General Isaac Jones penned a lengthy opinion declaring the Chief Justice’s decision “illegal null 
and void,” and suggesting that Governor Swann ask the legislature to “appropriate funds to 
defend these cases.”213 The large numbers of children freed during the Bureau’s final year of 
operation in Maryland indicated that Jones’s argument did not win the day in court. Ultimately, 
though, unresolved complaints of illegal apprenticeship revealed that the practice persisted—at 
least until children aged out of indentures—in part because of reluctance, on the part of the 
Bureau’s D.C. leadership, to intervene further during the agency’s waning days.214 Nevertheless, 
legal advocacy by Bureau lawyers and agents in Maryland served an important political function, 
helping to publicize both the state’s intransigence and the new legal remedies available to 
freedpeople. The legal campaign that culminated in Turner, and the demise of one of the most 
visible forms of de facto slavery in the postwar South, demonstrated the radical potential of 
grassroots organizing by freedpeople coupled with federally funded legal assistance. 
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III. Conclusion  
 Beyond its immediate impact on Reconstruction-era criminal defense and civil rights 
enforcement, the legacy of the Bureau’s legal aid efforts—for the local administration of justice 
and access to legal counsel—is difficult to gauge with certainty. In the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, municipal government functions—for example, salaried, elected prosecutors 
and police—expanded and professionalized, as did the legal practice generally.215 But while 
many state laws permitted or directed courts to assign counsel to the poor, and state courts 
increasingly recognized attorneys’ duty to serve indigent defendants when appointed by the 
court, states’ willingness to fund public defense remained limited.216 Thus, Bureau-funded legal 
assistance in criminal and civil cases marked a brief but significant venture in the history of 
state-sponsored legal aid, a moment in which freedpeople and Bureau officers sought to realize 
the right to counsel enshrined in the Maryland constitution and the Sixth Amendment.217  
The Bureau’s legal campaign in Maryland should not be dismissed as a contained, 
temporary response to a moment of legal crisis—even if it did not necessarily signal, at that time, 
a broader conceptual shift about the federal government’s responsibility to provide access to 
counsel. The ordeal of black Marylanders exposed the massive demand for legal assistance and 
the possibilities of government-funded legal aid as a tool for racial justice.  In postwar Maryland, 
black plaintiffs and federal lawyers deployed many of the same tools that would be instrumental 
in the twentieth-century civil rights struggle, including mass petitioning and test case litigation. 
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 48 
The Maryland campaign set out a blueprint that might have been replicated on many fronts in the 
postwar South, if federal resources for legal aid had been extended rather than withdrawn. The 
history of the Bureau’s legal aid program may therefore help to illuminate a broader story, not 
just about the failures and possibilities of Reconstruction, but also about the government’s 
shifting commitment to civil rights and legal services for the poor, and the complex interaction 
between legal aid lawyers and clients in shaping the social justice function of legal aid.  
